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A discount  in the secondary  market is a case for debt service
relief but not necessarily  for a write-off.  The author derives  a
"maximum  repayment"  rescheduling  program,  which  trades  off
higher  current  investment  for lower  current  debt service.
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Proposit.on 1: The "maximum repayment"  wvile the market price of the debt is stabilized at
program the lenders would like to monitor  a constant equilibrium price below par.
involve a fixed investment rate that is smaller
than the socially optimal rate and larger than the  (Implication:  Observing a discount on the
post-default rate.  It involves a transfer of  debt does not automatically warrant a write-off.
resources from the debtor that is a fixed fraction  The discount implies the possibility of default,
of GDP - a fraction that is smaller than the cost  but lenders should not write the debt off until the
of default.  possibility materializes.  But the service of the
debt shlould  always be scaled down by its
Proposition 2:  When the debt-to-GDP ratio  market value rather than kept in line with its face
is above a floor value (h*), the lenders can  value.)
capture the "maximum repayment" value (V*)
by fictitiously splitting the debt into performing  Proposition 4:  When the lenders reschedule
and nonperfonning components.  Each period,  the debt on a period-by-period basis, they induce
they should ask the borrower to service the  the country to follow a growth pattem that
perfonming component of the debt only, and let  exactly mimics the post-default path.  The
the performing component grow at a rate equal  lenders capture each period the penalty they
to the economy's expected growth rate.  Mean-  could impose on the defaulting country. As a
while, the nonperforming asset is automatically  result, they get more on a period-by-period
capitalized at the riskless rate.  When the actual  basis, but less on average than under the "maxi-
growth rate of the economy is above (below) its  mum repayment" schedule.  Under such a ("time
expected level, the performing part of the debt is  consistent") rescheduling strategy, a write-off
scaled up (down).  When this "maximum  and multiyear rescheduling may prove benefi-
repayment" rescheduling strategy is undertaken,  cial, but the gains fall short of the strategy
the equilibrium market value of the debt is equal  defined in Proposition 2.
to V*.
How relevant is the idea of "debt overhang"
Proposition 3:  When the debt-to-GDP ratio  (according to which the market value of the debt
is above the  hreshold h*, the debt can be written  may depend negatively upon its fact value)?
down to h* GDP without impairing the lender's  Empirical evidence presented here indicates that,
return.  If the write-off is repeated each time the  at a 75 percent confidence level, 9 of 33 coun-
economy declines, and if the rescheduling is  tries studied may suffer from a debt overhang
undertaken according to Proposition 2, the  prblem.  At a 90 percent confidence level, only
lenders capture the "maximum repayment"  4 of them may be affected by it.
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In 1988,  the  price  on the secondary  market  of LDC  dJebt  averaged  50
cents  per dollar  of face  value. This  figure  is  certainly  an indication  that
the lenders  do not  expect  (on  average)  to be repaid  the full  value  of their
outstanding  claims  on LDCs  and indeed  that  they  expect  perhaps  no more than
half  the  value  of these  claims  to  be  serviced.  1/  Prom  the  observation  of such
a discount  in the  secondary  markets,  can one  go one step further  and argue
that  the  debt  should  be written  down in  order  to  account  for  the  discrepancy
between  the face  and the  market  value  of  the  debt?  It is  this  question  that
this  paper  tries  to  shed  some  light  on,  both  theoretically  and  empirically.
Theoretically,  the rough  answer  is as follows.  A discount  in the
secondary  market can  be  the effect of  two  distinct  causes:  one  is  that
past shocks  may have impaired  the capability  of a debtor to service  its
;ebt.  Another  cause  is that future  shocks  may be expected  to impair,  when
they  occur. .he  servicing  capacity  of the  country. Por  instance,  the  fall  in
the price  of oil that  occurred  in 1986,  if viewed  as permanent,  is  a shock
which (at that time)  certainly  reduced  the expected  ability  of Mexico to
service  its  external  debt,  and,  to some  extent,  was  translated  into  a fall  of
the  market  price  of Mexico's  debt. On the  other  hand,  the  prospect  of say,  a
Middle-Eastern  peace  settlement,  which  brings  the  expectation  of  increased  oil
1/  The  secondary  market  is  a thin  market  in  which,  until  recently,  swap
transactions  have  predominated.  Hence  secondary  market  prices  may  not
accurately  reflect  market  expectations.  For  the  purpose  of the  analysis  here,
we assume  that  the  secondary  market  price  does  reflect  the  expected  value  of
discounted  future  debt  service.- 2 -
supplies,  is also  part  of Mexico's  debt  value,  but  its  implications  for  debt
relief  are  dramatically  different.  As  I  will  indicate  in  the  theoretical  part
of this  paper,  only  the  shocks  of the first  kind--the  "backward  shocks"--are
open to debt relief.,  As for the  others--"forward  shocks"--writing  off and
forgiveness  is  only  optimal  after  the  shocks  occur  but  not  beforehand.
Even though  it  may  not  always  be a good  thing  to  write  off  the  debt
in  order  to account  for  the  discrepancy  between  its  face  and  its  market  value,
I will show  that  the service  of the  debt  should  always  be scaled  down  by its
market  value  rather  than  kept  in  line  with  its  face  value.
Specifically,  I  will show  that  the  optimal  rescheduling  of the  debt
should proceed as follows.  The lenders  should  split the debt into two
components:  a performing  and  a non-performing  part. They should  act "as  if"
the debt amounted  to the  performing  component  and scale  how much money the
borrower should pay in debt service  on that part only (while  the non-
performing  part is automatically  capitalized  at the riskless  rate).  The
performing  component  of the  debt  should  reflect  the  market  value  of the  debt
but  it is  important  that  the  lenders  calculate  it  themselves.  If they  were  to
rely on the market  estimate,  the borrower  would  have  an incentive  to bring
down the market  price through  poor policies  or through  confrontations  with
creditors.  Nevertheless,  at equilibrium,  the lenders'  and the market's
evaluation  should  coincide.  2/
On the  other  hand,  the  non-performing  asset  should  not  necessarily  be
written  down.  Good  outcomes  can  occur  (or  expected  bad  outcomes  may  fail  to
materialize)  and,  conditionally  on the  good  news,  the size  of the  performing
2/  See  the  caveat  in footnote  1.- 3  -
asset  may  be scaled  up.  In  brief,  the  answer  to  the  question  in the  title  of
this  paper  is  as follows: (1)  Yes,  a discount  on the  secondary  market  implies
that the service  of the  debt should  be scaled  down in line  with its  market
values  (2)  No, such  a strategy  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  face  value
should  be  written  down. A  discount  in  the  secondary  market  is  a case  for  debt
service  relief,  not  necessarily  for  a write-off.
Obviously,  there  may come a point  in time  when the non-performing
asset  becomes  so  big  as to  warrant  a write-ofi.  However,  if  creditors  operate
optimally  (along  the  lines  sketched  above),  the  write-off  does  not  modify  the
market  value  of the  debt;  it  simply  raises  the  market  price. This  should  come
as no surprise. If they  behave  optimally,  the lenders  should  not lose by
having  more  nominal  claims  than  less.
How  does  this  result  relate  to the  "debt  overhang"  idea,  according  to
which the market  value  may depend  negatively  upon the face value of the
debt?  The link  may  come  as follows. In order  to achieve  their  first  best
outcomep  I  will  show  that  the  lenders  must  reschedule  the  performing  component
of the  debt  generously  enough  to  allow  for  the  country's  investment  needs  and,
on  average,  they  should  let  the  performing  asset  grow  along  with  CDP. While  a
strategy  along  these  lines  is shown  to  be  optimal  for  the  lenders,  it is not
however the case that such a strategy  is "time-consistent"  (as initially
defined  by  Calvo  and  Kydland  and  Prescott).  It  is  not  a strategy  which  can  be
implmented  on  a period-by-period  basis.
Indeed,  if dealt  with  on a period-by-period  basis  (without  setting
out the rules  of future  reschedulings)  I will show that  a self-fulfulling
downward  spiral  is bound  to appear: one in which  the fear  that  the lender
will  not  acknowledge  the  investment  needs  of  the  debtor  immediately  raises  the- 4  -
cost of capital  in the debtor  country,  reducing  investment  immediately  and
making it ex post-optimal  for  the  lenders  to  tighten  their  rescheduling
strategy.
In  the  previous  literature  on  the  "debt  overhang"  problem  (originated
by  and  Krugman (1987)  Sachs  (1988)),  only  these  second  best  equilibria  have
been  examined  (for  the  technical  reason  that  most  of  the  models  examined  in
this  literature  are  two-period  models  in  which  the  commitment  issue  could  not
be  addressed).  In  such  a  case,  when  the  lenders  fail  to  commit  themselves  to
their  first  best  strategy,  a write-off  may  indeed  prove  beneficial,  by  helping
the  lenders  to  commit  themselves  to  let  the  country  invest.  In  no  case,
however,  can  it  help  them  get  the  first  best  repayment  stream.
Whether  the  "debt  overhang"  problem  is  empirically  relevant  has
remained  an  open  question  (see  Claessens  (1988)  for  a  review.).  Following  an
idea  in  Krugman  (1988),  one  may  check  whether  the  elasticity  of  the  market
price  of  the  debt  with  respect  to  its  face  value  is  larger  than  one in
absolute  value.  In the  last  section  of the  paper,  I  will indicate  that,  at
the 75 per nt degree  of confidence,  9 countries  (in  a sample  of 33) may
suffer  (accord.ug  to Krugman's  test)  from  a debt  overhang  problem,  while  at
the  90  percent  degree  of confidence,  only  4  of them  may  be  affected  by it.
Before  closing  this introduction,  I should  emphasize  that the case
for  a write-off  which  is explored  in this  paper  only  rests  upon  the  question
of knowing  whether  the  private  lenders  may find  it in their  best  interest  to
do so.  This is obviously  only a narrow  way of dealing  with the overall
question.  A write-off  may prove  beneficial  to the lending  countries  as a
whole,  when  all  the  relevant  spillovers  are  taken  into  account,  and  not  to  the
private  lenders  themselves.  (For such a broader  viewpoint  see Dornbusch(1988).)  In any case,  if  the industrialized  countries  wanted  to help the
debtors (for whatever  reason:  altraism  or educated  selfishness),  then a
partial  forgiveness  of the debt  may be . crucial  preliminary  step  that the
industrialized  countries  would  want to encourage--perhaps  through  regulatory
or tax  measures--on  the  part  of private  lenders.  Without  partial  forgiveness,
the  lenders  may tend  to be the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  public  funds  poured
into  the  debtor  country.) All  these  crucial  issues  are  outside  the  scope  of
this  paper  but  should  be  kept  in  mind  before  any  policy  conclusion  is  drawn.
Section  1 spells  out the  model.  It is  a stochastic  version  of the
model  examined  in Cohen  and Sachs  (1986). Section  2 calculates  the  socially
efficient  and the  post-default  growth  rates  of the  economy. Section  3 shows
that the  lenders,  if they  were  to monitor  the  investment  and  the  consumption
strategy  of the  borrower  (in  order  to  maximize  their  return)  would  choose  a
lower  investment  strategy  than  the socially  efficient  one.  Section  4 shows
how  an  optimal  rescheduling  (based  upon  the  distinction  between  performing  and
non-performing  assets)  can achieve  the equilibrium  described  in Section  3.
Section  5 shows  the  dynamic  inconsistency  of the  optimal  strategy  spelled  out
in Section 4, and shows the link with the "debt overhang"  literature.
Section  6  investigates  the  empirical  relevance  of the  "debt  overhang."
I.  The  Setup
(a)  Production
I will consider  a one-good  economy,  in which  the  same good can be
used for export,  consumption  or investment. In each period,  the available
stock  of capital  is a pre-determined  variable.  The production,  Qt' is a
linear  function  of  existing  capital:-6-
(1)  Qt '  Kt
Capital  can  be increased  through  investment,  and  investment  itself  is  a  costly
process.  Let  us assume  that  an increase  It  of capital  costs  Jt:
(2) Jt  I  (  2  t
t  t  2  Q
The  investment  decision  It,  while  taken  at  time  t,  increases  the  capital  stock
at  time  t  +  1,  according  a stochastic  law  of  motion:
(3) K  t+l  [  Kt(l-d)  4  It  (l*+t,i)
in  which  d is the  rate  of depreciation  of installed  capital  and  3t  is an iid
stochastic  variable  which  is  worth:
(4) et=  u with  probability  p
3,=  v  with  probability  1-p.
Here,  the  investment  decision  It  must  be  taken  before  its  productivity  (o  t,)
is known.  One can think of  Et  as a stochastic  shock  which  exogenieously
increases  (or  decreases)  the  productivity  of  installed  capital  stock. I shall
refer to the event of probability p  (where  the rate of growth  of the
productivity  of capital  is u)  as of the "good  state"  and to the event  of
probability  1  - p (when  productivity  experiences  a slower,  possibly  negative,growth  rate)  as  the  "bad  state." I  will  call  8 the  expected  rate  of growth  of
the  productivity  of capital:
(1+0)  - p  (1+u)  +  (1-p)  (liv).
(See  Gennotte,  Kharas  and  Sadeq  (1987)  for  a  model  with  a similar  structure.)
(b) Preferences
I  will  assume  that  the  country  is  managed  by  a social  planner  who  can
impose  on the  country an investment  and consumption  decision.  The planner's
preferences  are  represented  by  an intertemporal  expected  utility  function:
(5)  UO a  E  0  B  u  (C)
0  0  t
in which C. is the aggregate  consumption  of the country  at time t; and
u (C)  - 1  Cy 1 y <  1 and Y *  o, or  u  (C)  Log C when y =  °.
(c)  External  Debt
In  order  to focus  on the  question  raised  in  the  title,  I  will  simply
assume  that  the  country  inherits  an initial  debt  Do (assumed  to be  short-term)
which  is  large  enough  to be  quoted  below  par  on secondary  markets;  and  I  will
investigate  the optimal  rescheduling  strategy  for the lenders.  It is not
difficult  to show  how the  framework  which  is used  here  could  imply  that  the
optimal  borrowing  strategy  does involve  such a risk.  But some technical
issues  (such  as that of calculating  the  optimal  maturity  of the  debt)  would
take  this  paper  too  far  afield. (See  e.g.  Cohen  (1988)  for  an  analysis,  in  a- 8  -
three  period  model,  of the  difficulties  at  hand.)
Following  the  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981)  approach  and  my earlier  work
with Sachs, I  shall assume that the country  always  has the ability to
repudiate  its  stock  of outstanding  debt  while  the lenders  can retaliate  and
impose  on the  borrower  the  following  two  sanctions:
(a)  A defaulting  country  is forced  to financial  autarky  forever
after  it  has  defaulted.
(b)  The  productivity  of capital  of  the  defaulting  country  is  reduced
by a factor  A  so  that  the  post-default  technology  of production
is:
(6) Q  (1  - A)  t
In all that follows,  I will assume-that  the len.ders  are risk-neutral,  act
competitively,  and have access  to a riskless  rate  of interest  which stays
constant  all  along.  I will  assume  that  8  is low  enough  to insure  that the
country  will  be constrained  on the  borrowing  side. Furthermore,  I  will  leave
aside  all  bargaining  issues  and  assume  that  the  lenders  can  credibly  make  (at
each point  in time,  but  not  necessarily  for  the  entire  future)  a take-it-or-
leave-it  offer  to  the  debtor.- 9  -
II.  The  Optimal  Grovth  Rate: The  (Totally)  Open  Case  and  the  Post-Default
Case
In this section,  I would like  to calculate  the optimal  investment
strategy  in the two  extreme  cases  when the  country  has a free  access  to the
world financial  markets  en the  one hand and when it is forced  to a post-
default  path  on the  other  hand.
(a) The  open  economy  case
Assume  in this sub-section  that  A  I  in equation  (6) above,  i.e.
assume  that  the  country  cannot  repudiate  its  external  debt  (because  it is  too
costly). With  that  assumption,  the  model  boils  down  to the  standard  Fisherian
case  where the investment  decision  can be separated  from the consumption
decision. I will simply  solve,  here,  the  optimal  investment  decision. The
country wants to maximize  its productive  wealth when the return  on its
investment is  taken  to  be  the  world  riskleas rate  of  interest.
Kathematically,  this  amounts  to  solving  the  following  program:
(7) Wo  - Max  Eo {  1  [  IK  - I  (1.1i  It)
(I)t  >  °  (I  +  r)  t|Kt  I(1  20t)
The  solution  to  this  program  is  given  in  Appendix  1.  Given  the  linearities  in
the  model,  Wo is  shown  to  be  a linear  function  of initial  output:
(8)  w0 w  QO
and  is  obtained  by  picking  up  a fixed  investment  rate:- 10  -
i  It (9)  x
associated  to  a fixed  rate  of  gross  investment
(iO) y  t  i  +
(All  the  technical  conditions  for  the  equilibrium  to  exist  are spelled  out  in
appendix).  The  equilibrium  growth  rate  of the  economy  oscillates.  It  is  high
in the good state  of nature  [  (l*u)  'l4x-d)  ]  and low in the bad state  of
nature  t  (l+v)  (l-d)  ].
From here on, I will refer to this equilibrium  as the socially  efficient
equilibrium.
(b) The  post-default  case
Assume  now,  as another  extreme  case,  that  the  country  has defaulted
upon its external  debt.  In  that case,  the social  planner  must choose  its
investment  decision so as  to allocate  consumption  optimally  over time.
Kathematically,  the  planner  must  solve  the  following  programs
()u  d(Qo)  Mix  I  u [Qo 11  - (1  +  +  O) 
+  B p Ud[QO(lOu)  (l*x-d)J  +  8(l-p)  Ud [QO(lIv)(l*x-d)  }
in  which  Ud is  the  utility  level  that  the  planner  can  reach  when  the  available
output  is  QO at  the  initial  time.- 11  -
The  solution  is  spelled  out in  Appendix  I  where  it is shown  that  the
solution  Ud (QO)  can  be  written:
(12) Ud (Q)  C  QY  if  y  *  o  and  I  log  Q+ CO if  y - o
Yo  ~~~~1-s
in which  CY is a constant. The solution  is also shown  to involve  a fixed
investment  rate:
It
which  is smaller  than  the  socially  efficient  investment  rate  (obtained  in  the
open  economy  case).
III. The  "Maximum  Repayment"  Which  Can  Be  Extracted  from  an  Indebted  Country
In this section,  I will consider  the following  simple  problem.  I
will  assume  that  the  lenders  can  monitor  both  the  invPstment  and  the  repayment
strategy  of  the  debtor  in  such  a  way  as to  maximize  the  value  of the  transfers
made  abroad  by  the  country.  While  the  borrower  will  be  assumed  to  give  up its
sovereignty  over  its  consumption  and  investment  decision,  it  will  nevertheless
keep  its  sovereignty  over  the  matter  of  defaulting:  at  any point  in  time,  the
borrower  will stay free  to break  the  lenders'  rule  and to follow  afterwards
the  post-default  path  defined  by  equation  (12). In  other  words,  the  rules  of
the game in this section  are as follows:  the lenders  monitor  the debtor's
economy  so  as to  maximize  the  value  of the  transfers  channelled  abroad  by the
debtor,  subject  to the  constraint  that  the  program  is  never  expected  (neither
today  nor later  on) to be dominated  by a post-default  path.  Clearly,  under- 12  -
this set  of hypotheses,  the  value  of the  transfers  channelled  abroad  by the
debtor  will  provide  an  upper  bound  to  the  market  value  of  any  debt  accumulated
by  the  country.
Formally,  the  problem  can  be written  as  follows. Call  Pt the  amount
of  transfers  abroad made by the debtor, Yt the  gross  investment  rate
(inclusive  of the cost  of installation)  achieved  by the  country,  and Ct the
consumption  left  to  the  country.  One  has:
Ct  Qt (I-y) -p
Call:
(14)  Ut  E  t I  !St  atu  (C")}
the level  of utility  which  the  lenders'  program  is  expected  to  deliver  to  the
country. With this  notation,  the  program  that  the  lenders  must solve  is as
follows.
(15) Maximize E  0  o  0  t
subject  to  Ut  !  Ud (Qd) for  all  t.
in  which  Ud  (Qt)  is the  post-default  level  of utility  (as  defined  in  equation
(12)).
This problem  is solved  in Appendix  2.  Given the  many linearities
built in this model, the problem  boils  down to finding  a  fixed (gross)- 13  -
investment  rate y and a fixed  debt service  ration  Pt/Qt  which solves  the
problem  (15). The  solution  is shown  to involve  an investment  rate  which  lies
between  the  socially  efficient  rate  and  the  post-default  rate. One  can  state:
Proposition  1:  The "maximum  repayment"  program  which  the  lenders  would  like
to monitor  involves  a fixed  investment  rate  which  is smaller
than the socially  optimum  one and larger  than the post-
default  one.  It involves  a transfer  of resources  from the
debtor  which  is  a fixed  fraction  of GDP,  a fraction  which  is
smaller  than  the  cost  of  default.
From  Proposition  1,  we therefore  see  that  the  idea  according  to  which
the  debt may have a "pro-incentive"  effect  is not  granted  in the  context  of
the  exercise  which  is carried  through  here.  (For  another  approach  see  also
Corden  (1988)  or Helpman  (1988).) Even  when  it is  the  banks  themselves  that
design  the  investment  and  consumption  policy  of  the  borrower,  they  will  choose
a lower  investment  rate than  is socially  desirable. The reason  is that the
banks  must take  care to avoid  a situation  in  which the  country  may one  day
choose  to default.  A too rapid  path of capital  accumulation,  even while
socially  desirable,  will  raise  the  post-default  utility  of  the  country  and,  if
not  carefully  balanced,  can  be  counterproductive  to  the  banks.
Prom  here  on,  I  will  call  V  the  "maximum  repayment"  that  the  lenders
can  expect  to  receive  from  the  debtor.  Due  to  the  linearities
involved,  Vt can  be  written  as  a linear  function  of  current  output:
(16) V* = Z  Q- 14  -
In  appendix  2,  I  also  show that  the  fraction  of  CDP  which  is  channelled  abroad
can  be  written:
(17) b  =  z  [(1  +  r)  - (1  +  0) (1  +  x- d)J
in  which  z  is  the  net  investment  rate  that  is  described  in Proposition  1.
IV.  How  to  Implement  the  "Maximum Repayment"  Scheme
I will  now  indicate  how  the  lenders  can  indeed  capture  the  "maximum
repayunt" even  when  they  do  not  monitor  the  investment  and  consumption  choice
of the  borrower. Consider  the  following  decomposition  of the  debt:
(18)  Dta  V  +  R=
in  which  Dt is the  face  value  of the  debt,  Vt is the  maximum  value  calculated
above,  and  Rt is  the  residual.  Assume  that  the  lenders  fictitiously  regard  Rt
as  a  non-performing  asset  and only insist  on  V  being  serviced  (while  Rt is
automatically  capitalized).  Furthermore,  assume  that,  each  period,  they  ask
the  borrower  to  transfer  an  amount  Pt  which  is  the  amount  necessary  to keep
v*  growing  at  the  expected  rate  of  growth  of the  economy.
Under  these  assumptions  Pt  must  solve:- 15  -
(19) V*  =  (+r) V  P  =  (1+0) (1+x-d)  V t+l  t  t  t
in  which  (1+) (l+x-d)  =  p (l+u)  (l+x-d)  * (l-p)  (l+u)  (l+x-d)  is  the  expected
growth  rate  of  the  economy  when  the  investment  rate  x  has  been  selected  by the
debtor. Pt is  then  given  by:
Pt = l(lr)  - (1+0)  (lex-d)]  Vt
Pt  =  [  (l+r)  - (1+e)  (lex-d)  ]  Q
t  ~~~~~~~~~~~t
and the optimum  investment  decision  chosen  by the country  will coincide  with
the  "maximum  repayment"  strategy  designed  in equation  (17). (See  Appendix  2,
And  Portes  (1987)  for  a suggestion  in  the  same  spirit.)
Provided  that the non-performing  asset is initially  large  enough,
which amounts to assuming  that D/Q  >  h  with  h  a given threshold,  this
scheme  can be shown  to be repeated  for  ever  and indeed  deliver  the  "maximum
repayment"  scheme  (see  Appendix  2 for  further  details). If D/Q  is below  h ,
then the  non-performing  asset  should  be charged  a larger  interest  rate  until
the  face  value  of the  debt  reaches  the  h  Q ceiling.
It is crucial  to  note  that  this  fictitious  decomposition  of the  debt
into  a performing  and a non-performing  part  is updated  each  period. Indeed,
along  equation  (19)  V* is  only  teft  to  grow  at  a rate (1+0)  (l+s-d) which  is
the  average  growth  rate  of the  economy. If things  go well  the  actual  growth
rate will be larger  and Vt+l must be scaled  up; conversely,  Vt+l will be
scaled  down  if  the  bad  state  occurs.
The second  crucial  remark  to make is the following: the  performing- 16  -
asset is not  calculated  from  the  observation  of  the  market  value  of the  debt
but from the  theoretical  computation  of the  maximum  repayment  scheme. Even
though  they  do coincide  at the  equilibrium,  it is  crucial  that  the  lenders  do
not let  Pt depend  upon  the  observed  market  value  of Dt.  Indeed,  if  they  were
to  do so,  they  would  ask  to  be repaid:
Pt  =  8  (X)  [  (1*r)  - (1+8)  (1+x-d)  t
and tL. country  would  be induced  to bring  down  the  market  value  of the  debt.
Theme  results  can  be summarized  as  follows:
Proposition  2:  When  the  debt  to  GDP  ratio  is  above  a floor  value  h*,  the
lenders can capture the "maximum  repayment"'  value V* by
proceeding  as follows.  They should  fictitiously  split  the
debt into  a performing  and a non-performing  component,  the
performing  component  being  equal  to V*.  Each period,  they
should  ask the borrower  to service  the  performing  component
of the  debt  only,  and  let  the  performing  component  grow  at a
rate equal to the expected  growth rate of the economy.
Meanwhile  the  non-performing asset  is  automatically
capitalized  at the riskless  rate.  When the actual  growth
rate  of the  economy  is  above  (below)  its  expected  level,  the
performing  part  of the  debt  is scaled  up (scaled  down). When
this rescheduling  strategy  is undertaken,  the equilibrium
market  value  of the  debt  is  equal  to  V .- 17  -
Now obviously,  as time  passes,  the  size  of the  non-performing  asset
grows relative  to the performing  one, and some write-off  of the debt may
become  possible  without  impairiag  the lenders'  ability  to capture  V*t.  One
can  actually  show:
Proposition  3:  When  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  above  the  threshold  h*,  the
debt can be written-down  to h* CDP without  impairing  the
lenders'  return. If the  write-off  is repeated  each  time  the
economy  goes into  the bad state  and if the  rescheduling  is
undertaken  according  to Proposition  2, the lenders  capture
the  "maximum repayment"  while  the  market  price  of  the  debt  is
stabilized  at a  constant  equilibrium  price  below  par.
One  important  implication  of  Proposition  3  is  that  it  is  not  enough
to  observe  a  discount  on  the  debt  to  warrant  a  write-off.  The  intuition  is
that  hinted  at  in  the  introduction:  the discount  on  the  debt  takes  into
account  the  possibility  that  the  economy may go  into  a  bad  state.  But  lenders
have  no  reason  to  write-off  the  debt  before  that  prediction  materializes.  It
is  only  in  the  deterministic  case when  u  =  v  that  the  optimal  strategy  is
indeed  to  write-off  the  debt  "once  and  for  all"  (in  order  to  erase  whatever
backward  shocks  may have lifted  the  debt-to-CDP  ratio  above  h*)  and let  the
debt  be quoted  at par.
V.  The  "Debt  Overhang"  Problem  Revisited
In  view  of  Proposition  2,  it  appears  that  the  face  value  of  the  debt
is  of  little  importance  in  assessing  the  optimal  rescheduling  strategy  of  the- 18  -
debt.  This  should  come  as no surprise: when  they  behave  optimally,  lenders
get as much as the country  can  transfer  and  more  nominal  claim  cannot  imply
less actual  payments.  (See also Bulow  and Rogoff  (1988).)  This result,
however,  contradicts  the  "debt  overhang"  argument  according  to  which  too  large
a  nominal  claim  may excessively  discourage  investment  and reduce  the market
value  of the  debt.  I would  now like to indicate  how these  two  conflicting
views  can  be  reconciled.
A key  feature  of the optimal rescheduling  strategy  described  in
Proposition  2 is that lenders  should  let the performing  asset  grow at the
expected  growth  rate of this  economy. As apparent  from  equation  (17) this
implies that the service  of the debt is negatively  correlated  with the
investment  decision  of the borrower. Even though  such behavior  is in the
lenders' self-interest,  I  now want to show that this is not  a  "time-
consistent"  decision,  that is: it is a decision  which  is an optimal  one to
take  only  if  the  lenders  can  commit  themselves  (in  whatever  way:  sophisticated
contracting  or a built-in  reputation)  to implement  it later  on.  In order  to
see why  such a  commitment  is necessary,  assume  instead  that the lenders
operate  on a period-by-period  basis  and  simply  reschedule  the  debt  each  period
to the best  of their  ability,  taking  for  granted  that  they  will do the same
(and  will  be expected  to  do so)  later  on.  Such  a policy  can  be  characterized
as a "time-consistent"  policy:  it  -is  one which  is found  to be optimal  to
implement  today,  when it is expected  to be implemented  in  the  future. Since
the work of Kydland  and Prescott  (1977)  and Calvo  (1978),  it is well known
that such a  policy  maybe intertemporally  sub-optimal  (even though it is
pointwise  optimal). Let  us see  what the  outcome  of such  a "time-consistent"
rescheduling  strategy  would  be.- 19  -
As  shown  in Cohen and  Michel  (1988)  calculating  a time-consistent
policy  simply  amounts  to  finding  a feed-back  decision  rule  which,  here,  can  be
writtent
( 19 )  Pt  ,  bQt
in  which  b is the  largest  amount  that  the  lenders  can  ask  at  time  t  #hen  it is
expected  that  future  payments  will  be set  according  to  another  rule:
(20) Pt+  b~  Qt.s
which  they  take  as  given. A time  consistent  strategy  is  one  for  which,  at the
equilibrium,  b  - b.
The  equilibrium  is  calculated  in  Appendix  3.  It  is  shown  that  the  equilibrium
growth  rate is nothing  else  but the  post-defauLt  path  and that b  )  X  In
other  words  the "time-consistent"  policy  is simply  one in which  the lenders
take  every  period  the  costs  that  the  borrower  would  incur  by defaulting  and,
as  a  result,  their  rescheduling  strategy  simply  mimics  the  post-default  path
that  the  country  could  follow  on  its  own.
As  apparent from equation (19) a  time consistent  rescheduling
strategy  act as a tax  on outputs  the  borrower  expects  that  the  lenders  will
ask for as much as it can pay and  this  is  an amount  which,  it can foresee,
will  be proportional  to how  much  output  it can  generate. These  expectations
increase the shadow cost of  capital in the debtor country and  reduce
investment  immediately,  making  it  optimal  for  the  lenders  to  do what  they  are
expected  to:  disregard  the incentive  to invest  and ask  for  as much as they
can.- 20  -
It is this  downward  spiral  that  most  people  (I think)  have in mind
when discussing  the  debt overhang problem:  debt acts as  a  tax which
inefficiently  discourages  investment  and  less  annual  payment  from  the  debtor
would  imply  more  overall  income  to the  lenders. Under  these  circumstances,  a
write-off  may help the lenders.  In fact, a write-off  cum a multi-year
rescheduling  can perform  even  better  inasmuch  as it helps  the  lenders  commit
theuselves  to  put  an  explicit  ceiling  on  how  much  money  they  will  ask  for  each
period  to come.  It should  be clear,  however,  that  neither  a write-off  nor  a
multiyear  rescheduling  can help the  lenders  get the first  best,  unless,  the
rescheduling  is  made  contingent  upon  the  investment  decision  of the  borrower.
(See  Appendix  4 for  a formal  proof  of  these  statements).
To summarize,  one  can  state:
Propomition  4:  When  the  lenders  reschedule  the  debt  on  a period-by-period
basis,  they induce  the country  to follow  a growth  pattern
which exactly  mimics  the post-default  path.  The lenders
capture  each  period  the  penalty  that  they  could  impose  on the
defaulting  country. As a result  they  get  more  on a period-
by-period  basis,  but less  on  average  than  under  the  "maximum
repayment" scheme.  Under  such  a  ("time-consistent")
rescheduling strategy, a  write-off and  a  multi-year
rescheduling  may prove  beneficial,  but  the  gains  necessarily
fall  short  of  the  optimal  strategy  defined  in  Proposition  2.
VI.  Empirical  Relevance  of  the  "Debt  Overhang"  Problem
Let  us now  investigate  whether  the  "debt-overhang"  problem  is  or not
empirically  relevant.- 21  -
Krugman  (1987)  has  suggested  that  we  regard  the  "debt-overhang"  as  a
"Debt  Laffer  Curve"  problem,  the  question  at hand being:  does  more nominal
debt  imply  a lower  market  value  for  this  debt? A test  of the  "debt  overhang,"
according  to this formulation,  therefore  amounts  to deciding  whether the
elasticity  of the  market  price  of the  debt  with  respect  to its  face  value  is
strictly  larger  than  one  (in  absolute  value). Certainly  if  this  elasticity  is
larger than one, then one can make the case that the lenders operate
inefficiently.  However,  an elasticity  equal  to  or smaller  than  one  is  not in
itself  sufficient  to accept  the hypothesis  that the lenders  reschedule  the
debt  efficiently. In this section,  we shall  stick  to Krugman's  test, but
certainly  more work is  needed  in order  to investigate  the  efficiency  of the
rescheduling  process  which  has  been  undertaken  since  1982.
Previous  attempts  to  measure  the  elasticity  of the  price  of the  debt
with respect  to its nominal  value  systematically  found  a low estimate.  A
study by Purcell  and Orlanki,  following  a previous  estimate  by Sachs and
Huizinga,  reported  an elasticity  of 0.34.  We have estimated  an equation,
representative  of these  earlier  studies,  as follows:
(21)  Log p  =  5.06  - 0.653 log  D/X - 2.231  A/D - 1.016  R/D
(0.152)  (0.603)  (0.373)
- 0.274 Dummy 1987.12
(0.132)
B2 *  0.560  pooled  equations  for  1986.12  and  1987.12  data;  60  degrees  of
freedom. (Standard  errors  in  parenthesis).
p: price  of the  debt  (cents  on the  dollar).
D:  debt;  X: exports;  A: arrears;  RB amount  of rescheduling
since  1982.- 22  -
From  this  equation,  one  would  tend  to reject  at the  95  percent  level
of  confidence  that  the  elasticity  of the  debt  was larger  than  one.  Before
comnenting  on the insufficiency  of such an equation,  it is interesting  to
report  that  the  price  of the  debt  seems  to be very poorly  correlated  to
macroeconomic  data  related  to  the  country.  For  instance,  the  most  important
of these macroeconomic  data  (one  would  guess),  such  as  the non-interest
current account or  the domestic inflation  rate, never appeared to  be
significantly  correlated  with the price.  On the other hand, arrears  or
rescheduling  data  (as  we can  see  from  equation  (21))  alurays  perform  extremely
well.
These rasults  are summarized  in diagrams  1 to 3.  They tend to
indicate  that the market is extremely  sensitive  to the "punctuality"  of
payments  and  pay little attention  to overall  macroeconomic  performance.
Finally,  one  also  sees  from  equation  (21)  that  a dummy  separating  the  1986  and
1987  data  appears  to be significant.  This  may  be a reflection  of Citibank's
decision to build up  $3 billion  of reserves  against developing  country
exposure,  a  move  which  significantly  influenced  the  market.
Despite  its  appeal  and its  simplicity,  an equation  such  as (21)  is
extremely  misleading. First,  it leads  us to reject  the  hypothesis  that the
elasticity  of the  price  with  respect  to  debt  is larger  than  one  for  the  entire
sample. But  it  may  very  well  be  the  case  that  only  a sub-group  of countries
was hit by  the debt-overhang  problem.  Running,  for instance,  the same
regression  for the  sub-sample  of  countries  for  which  the  debt-to-export  ratio
is larger than 3  (a sub-sample  of 16 countries)  would yield a  larger
elasticity,  which we estimated  to be at 1.183 (with  a  standard  error of
0.339). Second,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  an equation  such  as (21)  takes- 23  -
the arrears and  the  rescheduling  variables  as  exogeneous,  while  these
variables  obviously  depend  upon debt  and perhaps  upon  the  price  itself. In
order  to overcome  these  two  difficulties  (to  which  one  should  also  add  a more
technical  one which  is that  the  price  being  smaller  than  one  hundred,  log  p
cannot  be normally  distributad),  we have  estimated  a reduced  form  equation  in
which  the  dependent  variable  has  the  logistic  form  log  (p  /100  - p),  so  as  to
let the  elasticity  depend  upon  the  level  of the  price. The  result  comes  as
follows:
(22) Log  P  u  2.152  - 1.509 log  D/X
lOO-P  (0.318)  (0.305)
-0.048  X  growth  - 0.583  Dummy  87.12
(0.024)  (0.288)
*2  u  0.389; pooled  equation  for  1986.12  and  1987.12  data;
60  degrees  of freedom;  X growth: rate  of growth  of
exports.
According  to this  equation  the  elasticity  of the  pricw  with respect
to debt (100  - p) is 1.509  (with  a standard  error  of  0.305). This indicates
that  the  debt overhang  problem  could  not be  rejected  at the  95 percent  level
degree  of confidence  for  these  countries  in the  sample  for  which  the  price  was
almost  zero (such  as  Sudan). More  generally,  Table  1 indicates  the  countries
for  which  the  debt-overhang  problem  could  not  be rejected  at various  degrees
of confidence.  At the 90 percent  level  of confidence,  only  4 countr-es  pass
the  test.- 24  -
Table  1
Countries  with  a Potential  Debt
Overhang  Problem
(as  of 1987.12)
At the  501  level  of  Argentina (34)
confidence: p  < 34  Jamaica (33)
1  Nigeria (29)
At the  75X  level  of  Dominican  Republic (23)
confidence: p c  23  Congo  (23)
Zaire  (19)
Zambia  (17)
Costa  Rica  (15)
At the  90X  level  of  Bolivia  (11)
confidence:  p  !  11  Peru  (7)
Nicaragua  (4)
At the  951  level  of
confidence:  p - o  Sudan  (2)
(The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  secondary  market  prices  in  cents
per  dollar).
Appendix  1.  Optimal  Growth  in the (Totally)  Open and In the Post-Default
Economy  Cases.
A)  The  open  economy  case
Prom  equation  (7),  doubling  QO would  also  double 0 so that  one  can  look for
*  such as in equation  (8).  w  is the  solution  to  the following  Bellman
equation  underlying  the  definition  of  W0 in  equation  (7):
(Al.l)  c  Mnax  {  1  - x  (I  +  x)
+  @  r  p(l  + u)  +  (1  - p)(l  * v)+  (1  *  x  - d))- 25  -
The  equilibrium  value  of  x  is
;a1  (1*o  --
(A1.2)  s  *  I(i+@)+r  ,  with  1  +  0  a  p (lou)  +  (1-p)(l+v).
We shall  assume  *  to  be positive.
Equation  (Al.I)  yields  that x  is  a solution  to:
(Al.3)  1  20 (A1.3)  X  x2  _  X  Ir @_ + d)  +  O(l - t  _  0+e 
The solution  that  is  socially  efficient  is:
(AY.4)(  + d) [I  - VI  (1-+-  -- i  )  I
which  exists  and  is  positive  if:
(Aoi5)  in2(1  rc  s  ) /(hl  as-  s  t  o);  l+  o
a  condition  which  we shall  assume  to  hold.- 26  -
B)  The  Post-Default  Case
Let us "guess"  that the solution  to equation  (11) can indeed  be
written:
(Al.6)  Ud (QO)  a  C  Q°
Then  the  "guess"  will  prove  to  be the  right  one  if
(Al.7)
C  - Miz { [1-k-yly+  B p 1(14u)  (lex-d))YCy+  B [  (l-p)  (lv) (l+x-d)  IYCYi
By the  envelope  theorem,  the  derivative  of the  right  - hand side  is
maller  than one  when  B  is small  enough  to induce  the  country  to be in the
borrowing  side.
Appendix  2:  The  "Maximum Repayment  Scheme"
Because  of  the  linear  structure  of  the  model,  one  has to  find  b  and
s  such  that
-b  Q*
b,  x  (1c+  r)  *0
subject  to  to (IBt  u  [(1  - b  - y  )  Q  )> Ud(Qo)
t  =  o
(The  statinarity  of  the  problem  implies  that  this  inequality,  if  it  holds  at
time  o,  will  also  hold  at  later  times).- 27  -
CSll  w (x)  the  solution  to:
(A2.1)  a  c(x)Qo  Q  * ,.,t  3lr)-lO)(1z^d)  QO
when  the investment  rate is  x.  The  problem  at  hand is  therefore  simply  that
of  finding:
(A2.2)  z*  Max  b  w(x)
b;x
subject  to:
A2.3)  80 0 t  (1  - b  - y)Q  Ud  (Qo)
Let
A2.4)  ut-  B  E  I  8o  4 Ui)I
(A2.3)  can  be  written:
(A2.5)  £t  p(I  - b - y)Y  (I  +  s - d)  ty  >  U  d(Qg
By duality,  maximizing  z* in (A2.2)  subject  to (A2.5)  amounts  to finding
z  which  is  a solution  to:
ud (  QO) - Hex  !  ut(  1 - Z*  y)Y  (I  + s - )  tY- 28  -
From the  definition  of  w (x)  - (1  +  r)  - (1  +  e) (1  +  x  - d) in  equation
(A2.1),  this  amounts  to  asking  the  country  to transfer:
Pt abQt  a  Z  (1  +  r)  - (1  +  8) (1  +  s - d)  Q
in  which  x is  freely  chosen  by  the  country  so  as to  maximize  its  utility.
Since  Ud (Qo)  =  6  Pt (1  - A  - Yd)Y(l  d5 
one  can  see  from  (A2.5)  that
bt< A and x  >  x
The investment  rate  is  larger  under  the  optimal  scheme  than  under  default.
Agpendix  3: The  Time  Consistent  Path
For  equation  (17),  the  lenders  want  to induce  the  country  to repay  in
each  period:
(A3.1)  Pt m Z  ((l  +  r) -(1  +  )(1  +  *  - d)]  Qt
in which z  and x  are the optimal  choice  defined  in Proposition  1.  Let us
show  that  Proposition  2 solves  this  problem  when  h* is  defined  as
(A3.2)  h* =  ^* (1  +  r)  - (1  * x - d) (1 + e)
(1  +  r)  - (1 +  x  - d) (1 +  u)- 29  -
and  when  the  price  of the  debt  is
(A3.3)  q*  ,(  +  r)  -(I  +  zs  M  )l  +  u)
(1  +  r)  - (1  +  x  - d)(l  + 0)
If (A3.1)  and (A3.3)  are  satisfied,  the  market  value  of the  debt  is  Z Qt  (the
maximum  value)  and Proposition  2 indicates  that  the  borrower  should  repay  Pt
so  that, when measured in market terms, the  debt grows at  the  rate
(1  +  )  (1  + x - d).  This  implies  that  Pt  must  be  such  that
q  D5  1  (I  +  r)  q  Dt  Pt  a  q  Dt (1  +  )(  +  X - d)
so  that
?  *[(l  +  r)  - (1  +  e)(  + *x  - d)|  Qt
Given  this  rule  of the  game,  the  country  must:
Naxi  idze  '  (  1  +  x  J)t  Y { (1  - z ((1  +  r) - (1  +  x  - d)]  - y P
0 
which  is  exactly  the  problem  at  hand  in  Appendix  2.
Appendix  4:  MYRAs  and  Write-Offs  a
In order  to see  how a multi-year  rescheduling  agreement  associated
with a  write-off  can help time-consistent  lenders,  let us restrict the
analysis  to the  deterministic  case  when  u =  v.  Assume  that  the lenders  are
trapped  into  the  tim-consistent  strategy  by which  they  are  expected  to (and
indeed  do)  levy  Pt-b  t  each  period. Assume  that  they  reschedule  the  debt  on- 30  -
a  long  run  basis  so  as  to  let  each  period's  payment  falling  due  equal:
t
with  g  being  some  exogenous  growth  rate. The  country  now  must:
(A-l)  Max  B  u [Qt-  J  Pt]
and one sees  that the  disincentive  to growth  is eliminated  (inasmuch  as  the
borrwer  takes  Pt as not  contingent  upon  Qt).  Clearly  there  exists  a  value  of
Po and  g for  which  the  equilibrium  growth  rate  of the  economy  coincides  with  g
and for  which  the  borrower  is exactly  indifferent  between  servicing  the  debt
and defaulting. For  this  equilibrium  one  finds  that  lenders  raise  the  value
of their claim above the time-consistent  pay-off  (to the extent  that the
disencentive  to grow has been  eliminated)  but fall  short  of the first  best
strategy  (to the  extent  that the incentive  to grow has not been optimally
designed).  In order  to require  (A4.1),  the  lenders  must  therefore  write  off
part  of  the  debt  below  the  "maximum repayment"  value.- 31  -
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